Solutions such as a composite global carbon price index could go a long way in realising the climate finance goals framed at the Glasgow Climate Summit. But here are a few hurdles the world needs to climb to make it happen
A few days before the Glasgow Climate Summit last year, a section of climate economists proposed a global carbon price of $100/tonne as the threshold lever that would push the world to net zero emissions by 2050. The pitch for setting a worldwide price for carbon has not died down since then. Rather, it appears to have gained renewed traction in recent months.
What is not realised in these debates is that a global carbon price cannot be arbitrarily laid down from above. Nor is a unified global carbon price attainable. Apart from the well-stated Common but Differentiated Principle (CBDR), there is an implicit subsidiarity maxim underlying Para 5 of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, wherein the importance of recognising the special situation of developing countries in climate action is clearly stated. It follows that carbon pricing needs to be initiated at the national level. The marginal abatement costs of carbon emissions vary from country to country. So do carbon prices. By harmonising and interconnecting different country/regional level carbon prices, and developing a composite carbon price index, one could arrive at a dynamic, global carbon price indicator which is not the same as a unified carbon price.
Of the two methods of setting carbon prices, viz, carbon taxes and carbon markets, the former has proved to be contentious in developing country contexts. Barring exceptions like South Africa, developing countries in general are reluctant to embrace carbon taxes as a means of fixing carbon prices for fear of burdening their economy.
Carbon markets, on the other hand, have the potential to be sound mechanisms of price discovery. However, these markets differ in their scope and pricing mechanisms and are hence not comparable. Plain vanilla carbon markets that incentivise performing companies to sell their surplus allowances to non-complying ones are less complex and hence more effective in reducing carbon emissions.
In carbon offset markets, entities buy offsets (in the shape of credits arising from renewable energy and carbon sequestration projects) from external sources to compensate for their inability to comply with emission reduction targets. These markets are structurally different from allowance-based carbon markets as they trade in offset securities that follow a different logic of pricing.
[This article has been published with permission from IIM Bangalore. www.iimb.ac.in Views expressed are personal.]