In the new global order, corporate nationality may be one of the most significant factors for many companies, whether they have international operations or not
In the latest round of the global tech battle, the U.S. government ordered Nvidia – an American semiconductor chip manufacturer – to stop exporting cutting edge chips used in artificial intelligence to China. Shares of Nvidia fell by about 9 percent, wiping out about US$40 billion in market value. The company expects to lose $400 million in sales in a single quarter.
As economic and geopolitical competition heats up, managers should expect more restrictions on where, when, and how their firms can compete. This is a far cry from not too long ago, when politics was opening markets, not closing them. Back then, the concerns were about stateless companies, metanationals, or denationalized firms that were not bound by geography. A firm that was headquartered in one country, had its top management team in another, financial assets in a third, and employees and operations in several others. Allegiance to or even affiliation with a political state was considered unnecessary, a disadvantage, or irrelevant. Some of the largest firms were seen as more powerful than many nation states.
That narrative, however, seems to have come to a screeching halt. Corporate nationality is back, whether by design or default. No longer can firms deny or overlook their nationality. In the new global order, corporate nationality may be one of the most significant factors for many companies, whether they have international operations or not. Managers who don’t consider this aspect of their business will be ill-equipped to deal with geopolitical factors, fail to assess political risks, and underleverage potential advantages.
First, some firms will face increased hostility in foreign markets not because of their corporate actions but because of their corporate nationality. A stark example is the pressure Chinese firms faced in India in 2020. Following a border clash between India and China, more than 300 Chinese apps – including Tencent Holding’s WeChat and ByteDance’s Tiktok – were banned in India. Many of these apps were hugely popular in India prior to the ban. For instance, TikTok was the top downloaded app in India on the Android platform in 2019. And for ByteDance, India was among the largest markets outside China. Their exit from the country, then, had little to do with the market factors, and everything to do with their corporate nationality.
We can see a similar narrative in the case of Qualcomm, an American chip maker. Their proposed takeover of the Dutch company NXP was derailed in 2018 when China let the clock run out on the deal, forcing Qualcomm to pay a $2 billion break-up fee. Although the Chinese state media reported that the actions reflected the enforcement of antitrust laws, Qualcomm CEO Steve Mollenkopf highlighted geopolitical considerations. Indeed, China’s actions came right on the heels of US action to block a $117 billion takeover of Qualcomm, crippling actions on the Chinese telecommunications company ZTE, and additional tariffs on Chinese goods worth tens of billions of dollars. Set against this background Mollenkopf acknowledged in a Reuters report, “We obviously got caught up in something that was above us, so I don’t know if I would conclude anything about our own business, our ability to invest [in China] or partner with Chinese companiesâ€.